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We examine the impact of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Cost 
of Going Public. We find a statistically significant increase in the cost of going public 
of about 90 basispoints of gross proceeds due to substantially higher accounting 
and  legal  fees.  Meanwhile,  the  fees  paid  to  underwriters  remain  unchanged. 
Smaller firms are by far more heavily affected than larger firms, as the SOX-effect 
turns out to have a fixed-cost character. In fact, while we show that firms with an 
offering size of $250 millions are almost unaffected by SOX, the flotation cost in-
crease for offerings up to $100 millions is at a relatively stable level of 0.5 million 
year 2000 dollars. We control our results for a potential selection bias by applying 
a propensity score matching approach. Overall the results suggest that SOX might 
have improved the amount and quality of information being available within the 
IPO process. As IPO pricing is highly related to the degree of publicly available in-
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1. Introduction 
It  is  commonly  agreed  that  the  enactment  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley-Act  (SOX)  in 
2002 has imposed substantial additional regulatory cost on publicly traded firms in 
the  US.  This,  however,  gives  no  indication  on  the  sign  of  the  welfare  effects  of 
SOX. In fact, it might well be that increased transparency, reliability and account-
ability in the corporate sector altogether outweighs the additional cost of compli-
ance. For the time being, the empirical literature regarding the market’s reaction to 
the introduction of SOX is still inconclusive.
1 Some papers document effects that 
are in accordance with the view that overall the cost of capital should have de-
creased. For instance, Jain et al. (2006) show that market liquidity improves after 
the enactment of SOX. Jain and Rezaee (2006), Li et al. (2008), and Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2007) document positive abnormal returns over periods surrounding 
rulemaking events. 
However, other papers indicate that the net wealth effect of SOX might be nega-
tive.  By  comparing  stock  price  movements  of  foreign  firms  with  US-based  firms 
Zhang (2007) deduces that the costs of SOX largely outweigh their benefits. Also, 
Engel  et  al.  (2007)  document  negative  market  reactions  which  are  most  pro-
nounced for smaller firms. Wintoki (2007) finds an effect on firm value, although 
he shows that price reactions depend on firm characteristics related to its corporate 
governance set-up. Litvak (2007) finds that cross-listing premiums of foreign issu-
ers have declined after the introduction of SOX. Evidence quoted by Carney (2006) 
indicates that premiums of D&O insurances have increased substantially after the 
enactment of SOX, and he furthermore presents evidence for an increasing ten-
dency towards exiting the public market in the US (i.e., going private) after the 
introduction of SOX. Kamar et al. (2007) calculate that for smaller listed firms it 
has become more likely to be sold to private investors.  
Research regarding the impact of SOX on the US IPO market is rare. Bargeron et 
al. (2006) show that the likelihood of undertaking an IPO in the US has decreased 
compared  to  the  likelihood  of  undertaking  the  IPO  in  the  UK,  and  Leon  (2006) 
shows that the US have lost market share in global equity offerings. Both papers, 
however, argue that their findings are the result of what companies have to expect 
to fulfil when being public. In this sense, the question whether the provisions of 
SOX  already  materialize  at  the  IPO  stage  has  neither  been  addressed  nor  an-
swered. This, however, is an important question, as SOX claims to improve trans-
parency, reliability and accountability in listed firms. If this is the case, SOX should 
have an impact on information production for firms aiming to go public. 
                                            
1 For a comprehensive overview on this issue cf. Coates (2007). 4 
This paper intends to fill this gap by examining whether SOX has had an impact on 
IPOs in the U.S. We approach this issue by looking at the direct costs of going pub-
lic, and this for two reasons. First, the direct costs and its components are very 
well documented  and  allow  for  a  profound  empirical analysis.  Second,  the  costs 
associated with the offering can well be regarded as a proxy for the level of effort 
invested by different players in the IPO process such as underwriters, accounting 
firms  and  legal  firms.  Higher  costs  for  information  production  should  potentially 
lead to more or higher quality information being available to investors.  
For the empirical analysis, we form a data sample consisting of 1,116 IPOs which 
took place at either NASDAQ or NYSE between 1998 and 2007, and analyze several 
components of the direct costs of going public. Our main findings can be summa-
rized as follows. We find a statistically highly significant increase in the cost of go-
ing public of about 90 basispoints of gross proceeds. This increase is almost en-
tirely due to an increase in accounting and legal fees, while the underwritings fees 
are almost unaffected by SOX. Moreover, we can show that the increase in flotation 
costs is to a large extent an increase in fixed costs. Specifically, for firms with pro-
ceeds of up to $100 millions the increase is relatively stable at 0.5 million year 
2000 dollars. Hence, SOX has had a substantial impact on flotation costs for small 
firms, while the effect seems to be negligible for larger firms. 
Furthermore, we show that our results are not driven by a selection bias due to a 
changing composition of the IPO firms after SOX. For that purpose we test the ro-
bustness of our results on the basis of a matched sample approach. Using the pro-
pensity score matching technique we estimate what would have been the flotation 
cost  if  a  firm  went  public  before  the  SOX  enactment  instead  of  afterwards.  We 
show that the findings are almost the same when applying this matched sample 
approach. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 and 3 briefly discuss the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and its impact on the direct costs of going public. In Section 4, 
we describe the dataset and present the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes 
the main findings. 
2. Relevant Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The main intention of SOX was to improve transparency in public companies by 
enhancing disclosure and monitoring requirements, preventing gatekeeper failure, 
and improving risk management systems. With this agenda, SOX was the direct 
response to a number of accounting scandals in 2000 and 2001 with the one of 5 
Enron being the most prominent example.
2 The Act tries to disengage both legal 
and  illegal  activities  which  disable  the  investor  to  proficiently  value  a  company. 
Earnings management or window dressing could be mentioned as legal activities, 
while manipulation of accounting information or concealment of material informa-
tion could be regarded as illegal activities. 
The rules on financial disclosures require public companies – among other things – 
to inform about off-balance sheet transactions and to provide pro forma balance 
sheets. The enhanced disclosure rules should substantially increase publicly avail-
able information and thus improve the transparency of public companies. The pro-
visions on internal controls (Section 404) require public companies to thoroughly 
disclose risks and to report on its disclosure controls and procedures – a burden-
some requirement which has been blamed most for consuming enormous organiza-
tional resources. 
Its widely extended monitoring requirements are another focal point of SOX. The 
Act obliges auditors to assess and audit the internal control structures. New inter-
nal controls are defined by the Act (Section 404) and range from internal monitor-
ing systems of operating performance and internal liabilities to an independent au-
dit committee. The whistleblower regulations of Section 806 are another form of 
monitoring, making executives subject to scrutiny by their subordinates. 
SOX also introduces a set of measures to regulate gatekeepers in order to enforce 
its monitoring requirements.
3 In this context the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board (PCAOB) is a major innovation brought about by SOX. The Board is a 
completely  new  independent  institution  regulating  audit  companies  and  defining 
audit standards. In order to avoid potential conflicts of interest, audit companies 
are prevented from cross-selling services to their audited companies. The same is 
true  for  investment  banks  that  have  to  separate  their  research  on  underwritten 
companies from the capital markets team. By ruling out potential conflicts of inter-
ests, investors can be assured that gatekeepers provide fair assessments of the 
financial condition of companies going or already being public. In particular, the 
problem of analysts overstating the value of a company trying to go public is ad-
dressed, and many forms of influencing the analysts’ opinion have been outlawed 
by SOX. Martin (2008) presents evidence for the notion that conflicts of interests of 
analysts have been reduced by SOX. Overall, the pressure on gatekeepers to per-
form a fair and objective job has substantially increased. 
                                            
2 For a discussion of the roots and intentions of SOX see e.g. Ribstein (2005). 
3 Ribstein (2005), pp. 5f. defines gatekeepers as “senior executives, independent directors, large audit-
ing firms, outside lawyers, securities analysts, the financial media and debt rating agencies”. The ac-
counting scandals in the early 2000s showed that the gatekeepers in place failed to do their jobs, often 
caused by conflicts of interests.  6 
It is thus not surprising that Eldrige and Kealy (2005) find an average increase in 
audit fees from 2003 to 2004 of $2.3 million. Furthermore they find that SOX audit 
costs increase with size, but that the SOX audit unit costs vary inversely with size, 
which indicates that large companies are able to benefit from economies of scale.
4 
Another study finds the increase of accounting and legal fees to be 62 percent on 
average since January 2004.
5 
3. SOX and the cost of going public 
Ritter (1987) and Lee et al. (1996) separate the total costs of going public into 
direct costs (gross underwriter spread plus other expenses related to the offering) 
and indirect costs (initial underpricing). Subsequently, we will briefly discuss the 
direct cost components - which are in the focus of this paper - and the eventual 
impact of SOX on these components. 
The  most  important  direct  cost  component  in  an  IPO  is  the  gross  spread 
(=underwriting  fee),  which  the  issuer  has  to  pay  to  the  underwriting  syndicate. 
Chen and Ritter (2000) document a pronounced clustering of underwriting fees at 7 
percent, leading them to coin this phenomenon as the “7 percent rule”.
6 Hansen 
(2001) examines the question whether this 7 percent rule is the result of collusion 
among underwriters. The author does not find supporting evidence in favour of the 
collusion theory. In contrast, he suggests the 7 percent contract to be “an efficient 
innovation that better suits the IPO” while competition would rather take place on 
reputation,  placement  service,  and  underpricing.  However,  the  ex-ante  expected 
net effect of SOX on the underwriting fee seems ambiguous. On one side, it could 
be argued that having to make a firm SOX-compliant is a challenge that affects the 
services  offered  by  the  underwriter  and  therefore  makes  them  costlier.  On  the 
other side, however, legal responsibility is shared among more players after SOX 
and the degree of asymmetric information between the issuer and the underwriter 
may be reduced as well, which should have a mitigating impact on underwriting 
fees.
7 Overall we do not have a clear prediction of the impact of SOX on the net 
effect on the underwriting fees. Regarding the findings of Hansen (2001) it is also 
likely that underwriter fees remain completely unchanged. 
The remaining direct costs include other non-underwriting fees like all remaining 
costs related to the offering such as exchange listing and SEC registration fees, 
                                            
4 Cf. Elridge/Kealy (2005) p. 2. 
5 Cf. Carney (2006), p. 146-147. 
6 In other markets, however, clustering seems to be less present, as has been documented by Torstila 
(2003) or Kaserer and Kraft (2003). In earlier papers Ritter (1987) and Lee et al. (1996) reported even 
for the U.S. a negative relationship between IPO size and the gross spread. 
7 For example, Kaserer and Kraft (2003) document that underwriting fees increase monotonically with 
the degree of complexity in an IPO, and that underwriting fees are significantly lower for less volatile 
stocks. 7 
printing  and  marketing  expenses,  accounting and legal  fees.  The  introduction  of 
SOX  should  have  affected  these  cost  components  in  at  least  two  ways:  Higher 
compliance costs in general and additional costs associated with the implementa-
tion of SOX. Compliance costs primarily result from additional disclosure and moni-
toring requirements. Accounting and legal fees are expected to increase substan-
tially as the responsibilities of audit companies have been widely extended. Retain-
ing work papers and peer reviews for seven years and auditing the internal moni-
toring systems of public companies are just a few of the additional responsibilities 
of  auditors.  Furthermore,  audit  companies  face  additional  costs  for  funding  the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and annual quality reviews, 
which they pass on to their clients. Changing auditors every five years is another 
costly requirement.
8 Although most of these cost items tend to increase the firm’s 
cost of being public, they will most likely also have an impact on the cost of going 
public, as on that occasion auditing mechanisms have to be implemented for the 
first time. Overall, we would therefore expect the non-underwriting direct costs of 
going public to have increased in the after-SOX era. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1  Data 
Our  database  integrates  data  from  Thomson’s  Securities  Data  Company’s  (SDC) 
New Issues database and covers a 10-year period from January 1998 to December 
2007. We eliminate all Financial and Real Estate companies, foreign issuers, ADRs, 
ADSs and offerings with an offer price of less than five Dollars. We furthermore 
make several adjustments and exclusions where the data provided seem to be in-
accurate or contradicting. This leaves a total of 1116 bookbuilding IPOs.
9 
Most  of the company  specific data comes  from Thomson’s Securities Data Com-
pany’s (SDC) New Issues database. We obtain the offer price, proceeds raised, the 
number of primary and secondary shares issued from Thomson’s SDC database. 
The numbers from Thomson are cross-checked with general IPO data provided by 
the NASDAQ-Homepage, which provides information about all IPOs taking place in 
the US. The information on underwriting fees and other expenses such as legal and 
accounting fees are hand-collected from the registration statement S1 as filed with 
the SEC.  
                                            
8 Cf. Morrison (2004), p. 8. 
9 In order to have a sample which represents the whole IPO market over the period covered we do not 
exclude unit and tranche offerings. However, robustness tests which exclude such offerings do basically 
reveal the same results. 
 8 
All monetary values are stated in dollars and converted to purchasing prices of the 
year 2000 in order to control for inflation. Underpricing is defined as the first trad-
ing day return. To rank each underwriter, we use Loughran and Ritter’s updated 
measures of Carter and Manaster’s (1990) underwriter quality. Ranks range from 
zero to nine, with higher ranks representing higher-quality underwriters. For the 
empirical analysis, we use a reputation dummy which is coded 1 in case of a rank 
of at least eight and 0 otherwise. The data on company founding dates comes from 
the Field-Ritter dataset of company founding dates. The age of a company is de-
noted in years and calculated as the difference between founding and issuing date. 
Finally, we classify firms into several industry groupings. Firms that SDC defines as 
belonging to the high-tech industry are classified as technology firms. 
4.2  Analysis of the direct costs 
4.2.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample. On average, a company 
going public has to pay 9.28 percent of its gross proceeds for underwriting and 
non-underwriting expenses such as legal and accounting fees. The major part of 
the  total  direct  costs  (6.84  percent)  is  paid  to  the  underwriting  syndicate.  The 
mean non-underwriting expenses are equal to 2.43 percent, with accounting and 
legal fees making up for 65 percent of all non-underwriting expenses. The median 
IPO incurs costs of 8.96 percent. The median gross spread is exactly 7 percent; in 
almost 80 percent of all issues the underwriting fee was exactly equal to this fig-
ure.  The  median  non-underwriting  expenses  are  lower  than  the  average  ones, 
summing up to 2.00 percent. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table  2  presents  descriptive  statistics  on  the  pre-SOX  (Panel  B)  and  post-SOX 
(Panel A) periods respectively. Panel C reports the changes in means and medians 
as well as their statistical significance. Remarkably, almost all variables are statisti-
cally significant different between the pre- and post SOX-period. According to our 
sample, the total direct costs have on average increased by statistically significant 
but  economically  rather  moderate  33  basispoints  to  9.51  percent  of  gross  pro-
ceeds.
10 Meanwhile the fees paid to the underwriting syndicate are equal to 7.00 
percent in the median both before and after the introduction of SOX. On average, 
we report a significant reduction in underwriting fees by 12 basispoints. However, 
as the median IPO has been significantly larger after the introduction of SOX, the 
findings might be simply driven by scale effects inherent in the gross spread. Mean 
                                            
10 Note that all cost items are expressed in percent of gross proceeds. 9 
non-underwriting  fees  which  comprise  all  other  expenses  related  to  the  offering 
have  increased  by  46  basispoints  or  about  20  percent;  similar  holds  for  the  in-
crease in the median. The increase in accounting and legal fees, which are a part of 
the non-underwriting fees, is even stronger. Here the increase ranges between 51 
and 41 basispoints or 35 percent and 37 percent resp., depending on whether one 
looks at the mean or median. The firm-specific characteristics have changed even 
more dramatically. While the median (average) gross proceeds have increased by 
23.08 percent (+2.95 percent) to $69.39 ($149.95) million, median (average) as-
sets before the IPO more than doubled (+24.11 percent). The median (average) 
company age has increased by exactly 50 percent (+76.00 percent) from six to 
nine (21.2) years. The market share of NASDAQ venture capital backed IPOs and 
High-Technology firms have decreased significantly after the introduction of SOX, 
which indicates that the composition of the IPO market has been changed substan-
tially by the introduction of SOX. These findings furthermore suggest that the de-
gree of risk inherent in the IPO market has strongly declined in the aftermath of 
SOX. Apparently, small and rather risky companies tend to refrain from going pub-
lic. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
4.2.2  Modelling the direct costs of going public 
In order to isolate the impact of SOX on the results reported in the preceding sub-
section, we set up a linear regression model. From previous literature it is known 
that gross proceeds are the most powerful determinant of the direct costs of going 
public.
11 There are several suggestions about the functional form in which proceeds 
should be used to explain the direct costs. Torstila (2003) uses the natural loga-
rithm of gross proceeds in order to explain scale effects of the offering size on the 
gross spread.
12 In contrast, Kaserer and Kraft (2003) apply a quadratic cost func-
tion on a similar problem in order to capture a fixed-cost effect in the direct cost 
function.
13 Both approaches focus on the analysis of the gross spread, while in this 
paper we extend these approaches to the analysis of non-underwriting fees. Thus, 
in order to identify the most appropriate cost function we initially run simple linear 
regression models with gross proceeds as the only explanatory variable. Table 3 
reports the results of regressions in terms of R2 and F-statistics of different func-
tional  specifications.  It  can  be  seen  that  the  most  powerful  specification  is  the 
quadratic cost function as proposed by Kaserer and Kraft (2003). Here, however, 
multicollinearity might come up as an issue. Therefore, we will use PROCEEDS as 
                                            
11 Cf. Altinkiliç and Hansen (2001), Kaserer and Kraft (2003), Torstila (2003). 
12 Cf. Torstila (2003), p. 681. 
13 Cf. Kaserer and Kraft (2003), p. 16 n. 10 
an explanatory variable for the underwriter spread, and the inverse of PROCEEDS 
for all other cost items. According to Table 3 we do not loose much explanatory 
power by doing so, but we eliminate any multicollinearity issue from our analysis.
14 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Furthermore, we include the following control variables. As an additional measure 
of IPO size we use the assets of the company before the IPO in million dollars and 
adjusted to purchasing prices of 2000. In line with suggestions in the literature we 
also use the ratio of primary shares to all shares issued as an additional explana-
tory variable.
15 In order to see whether risk associated with the offering has an 
impact on costs, we furthermore integrate the age of the company going public. 
For the same purpose, we include a dummy variable indicating High-Technology 
IPOs. We also introduce a dummy variable for the NASDAQ to determine whether 
the listing venue affects the  costs  of going public. Furthermore, we employ two 
additional dummy variables for underwriter reputation and venture-backed IPOs to 
determine whether IPO stakeholders influence the direct costs of an IPO. Finally, 
SOX is a dummy variable set to 1 if the IPO has taken place between 2003 and 
2007. 
Table  4  documents  the  OLS-estimation  results  where  total  direct  flotation  costs 
(Panel A), gross spread (Panel B), non-underwriting fees (Panel C) as well as ac-
counting and legal fees (Panel D) are used as the dependent variable. Due to the 
presence  of  heteroskedasticity  we  apply  White’s  (1980)  heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors method for the variance of the least squares estimator 
and calculate the t-statistics for the coefficients accordingly.
16 It is worth to note 
that the model has high explanatory power as in all cases the r-squared is between 
45 percent and 61 percent. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The regression model in Panel A of Table 4 gives the results with respect to total 
direct costs. As the most important finding in the context of this paper, we note 
that the SOX-dummy documents a highly significant increase in costs of 89 basis-
points. As expected, the inverse of gross proceeds is the most powerful explana-
tory variable in the model. Assets before the IPO also have a statistically significant 
negative impact on the direct costs of going public. However, the effect is rather 
insignificant from an economical point of view and points out only very weak ec-
                                            
14 In fact, all VIF-factors are lower than 5 in our analysis. 
15 Cf. e. g. Altinkiliç and Hansen (2001), Kaserer and Kraft (2003). 
16 By applying a Goldfeld-Quandt test (cf. Greene (2000), p. 509), the null-hypothesis of homoskedas-
ticity had to be rejected at a confidence level of more than 99 percent. For applying that test the sample 
was split into two sub-samples with the first comprising offerings with less than $50 million and the 
second comprising offerings with more than $50 million. 11 
onomies of scale. Notably, the age of a company does have a negative impact on 
the costs of going public. To determine the reason for this effect, we need to look 
at the components subsequently. NASDAQ IPOs apparently do not face costs dif-
ferent from NYSE IPOs, the same seems to be true for High-Technology firms, for 
which the regression does not report any effect at all. Apparently, industry back-
ground  does  not  have  any  impact  on  the  direct  costs  of  going  public.  We  may 
therefore assume that our results regarding the effect of SOX are not driven by a 
selection bias caused by a change in the mix of IPOs. 
The regression model in Panel B of Table 4 describes the underwriting expenses. 
Here, the SOX-dummy reports a very small negative and statistically insignificant 
impact of SOX on the gross spread. The coefficients of the dummy variables for the 
NASDAQ, High-Technology and venture backed firms, and underwriter reputation 
are  statistically  significant  but  economically  rather  insignificant.  Altogether  these 
coefficients may be interpreted as such that risk inherent in the IPO has a minor 
influence on the gross spread charged by the underwriter. In general, the percep-
tion of Hansen (2001) that the 7 percent contract resembles an efficient contract 
where competition takes place on other means appears to be supported by empiri-
cal evidence. 
The  regression  models  in  Panel  C  and  Panel  D  of  Table  4  describe  the  non-
underwriting expenses and accounting and legal fees, which are part of the non-
underwriting expenses. In general, the coefficients of both models are very similar 
with  regards  to  amplitude  and  significance.  In  both  models,  the  SOX-dummy 
documents  a  statistically  significant  positive  coefficient  of  89  and  80  basispoints 
respectively. We may therefore conclude that the increase in costs is almost exclu-
sively driven by an increase in accounting and legal fees. The earlier reported im-
pact of company age and ratio of primary shares on the direct costs can as well be 
traced  back  to  accounting  and legal  fees.  Regarding  company  age  for  which  we 
report a negative coefficient, we assume that older companies have a better devel-
oped accounting infrastructure and therefore have to pay slightly less accounting 
and legal fees. Regarding the ratio of primary shares which positively impacts ac-
counting  and  legal  fees,  an  interpretation  is  not  that  obvious.  The  transition 
dummy which is set to 1 in 2002, reports a positive coefficient which is significantly 
lower than the coefficient reported by the SOX-dummy. It may thus be concluded 
that some, but not all companies going public in 2002 have been compliant to SOX 
already. 
Table 5 reports the regression results for a specific model – we add an additional 
explanatory variable which captures the interaction between the inverse of gross 
proceeds and the SOX-Dummy - for the whole and a matched sample. The reason 12 
to  employ  a  matched  sample  is  to  rule  out  that  our  results  are  driven  by  self-
selection. If SOX has had a differential impact on the propensity to go public on 
non-listed firms, for instance depending on size or other firm-specific characteris-
tics, a change in average direct costs might result. In order to address this issue 
one would have to answer the question what would have been the direct costs of 
post-SOX  IPOs,  if  they  had  gone  public  in  the  pre-SOX  era.  Hence,  we  are  in 
search of counterfactual evidence. It is known from the literature (cf. Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2008)) that propensity score matching (PSM) is one method to address 
this problem. In order to implement this approach we divide the whole sample into 
a treated (post-SOX IPOs) and an untreated (pre-SOX IPOs) group. For each IPO 
observation, we calculate a propensity score on the basis of the proceeds raised, 
assets  before  the  IPO,  and  company  age.
17  After  that,  each  observation  in  the 
post-SOX sample is matched with the nearest neighbour within the pre-SOX sam-
ple. We allowed pre-SOX IPOs to be a nearest neighbour more than once. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
The models in Panel A (whole sample) and Panel B (matched sample) of Table 5 
use the non-underwriting expenses as dependent variable. The regression results 
for the matched sample are basically the same as for the whole sample. We can 
thus rule out that our findings are driven by a selection bias. Furthermore, the re-
ported coefficients are in line with the ones reported for the base model in Table 4. 
Only the SOX-dummy variable is no longer statistically significant. Meanwhile the 
interaction term (SOX / IPO Proceeds) reports a statistically significant coefficient 
of approximately 0.70, respectively 0.61. The impact of SOX on the direct costs 
therefore is not constant, but strongly size dependent. According to our  results, 
SOX has an impact on fixed non-underwriting costs. Hence, in line with what we 
have expected, in particular small offerings appear to be affected by the introduc-
tion of SOX. 
The models in Panel C (whole sample) and Panel D (matched sample) of Table 5 
use the accounting and legal fees as dependent variable. The results are basically 
unchanged. The impact of SOX on accounting and legal fees is again size depend-
ent with small offerings being most affected by the introduction of SOX. Moreover, 
as the coefficients for the SOX-variables are almost unchanged, it can be deduced, 
once again, that the cost impact of SOX is almost entirely channelled via its impact 
on legal and accounting fees. As a difference it should be pointed out that company 
age no longer has an impact on accounting and legal fees. One explanation of this 
finding might be that the average age of companies going public has been signifi-
                                            
17 Including firm assets as an additional variable in the PSM does not alter the results. For lack of space 
we do not report this result in the paper. 13 
cantly higher after the introduction of SOX. Consequently, the results obtained for 
age in Table 4 might be driven by a change in the composition of the IPO market. 
Because of the general insignificance of age from an economic point of view and 
while not being the focus of this paper, we will not look deeper into this question. 
As a final robustness test, we modify the regression models tested earlier by sub-
stituting the SOX-dummy variable by annual dummy variables for the years from 
2003 to 2007. By these means, we are able to determine whether the observed 
impact is  constant  over  time.  This is  what  one  would  expect,  if  SOX  has  had  a 
structural  impact  on  the  costs  of  going  public.  We  additionally  include  a  year 
dummy for 2002 as we have seen earlier that a fraction of IPOs going public in 
2002 has apparently already been  compliant to SOX. The regression results are 
reported on Table 6. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
In Panel A, we analyze IPO non-underwriting expenses. The coefficients of the an-
nual dummies are in line with our prediction of a permanent structural break after 
the introduction of SOX. For all post-SOX years, the coefficients are positive and 
highly significant. For 2002 and 2003 the coefficients are significant, but lower than 
in the subsequent years. As SOX was passed on July 25, 2002, it was not applica-
ble to all IPOs having taken place in that year. To some extent this might also be 
true for some of the  IPOs having taken place in 2003 as the IPO  process often 
starts more than a year before the actual IPO. As there has been a transition pe-
riod during which the implementation of SOX was not mandatory, it may well be 
that many of the offerings in 2002 and 2003 were not compliant to SOX as well.  
The  regression  analysis  of  accounting  and legal  fees  in  Panel  B  provides  similar 
results with all annual dummies from 2003 to 2007 being positive and significant. 
Finally, by using a simple linear regression model where we explain costs by size, a 
dummy variable indicating the SOX period, and an interaction term of both vari-
ables (SOX / IPO Proceeds), we estimate the impact of SOX on different cost items 
for different offering sizes. The results are reported in Table 7. For a $20 million 
offering, the direct costs of going public increase by about 24 percent to 16.1 per-
cent. The increase is caused by accounting and legal fees which almost double to 
5.9 percent of gross proceeds. A $100 million offering still faces a total direct costs 
increase of about 5 percent or 40 basispoints of gross proceeds. For offerings with 
an issue size beyond $250 million, the impact of SOX on the costs of going public 
vanishes. Looking at the dollar-impact of SOX, we find that up to an offering sizes 
of $100 million the additional cost caused by SOX is quite stable and close to $0.5 
million. For larger issues, however, the dollar-impact becomes smaller, indicating 14 
that from a pure cost perspective larger IPOs where not significantly affected by 
SOX. One could conclude that from an auditing point of view SOX brought about 
that auditing efforts for small offerings adapted to the efforts made already in large 
offerings, which is further evidence in favour of the notion that SOX has helped to 
improve information quality and auditing standards in at least a substantial fraction 
of all IPOs. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examined the impact of the introduction of SOX on the cost of Going 
Public. According to ample evidence in the literature, we expected direct costs to 
significantly increase, mostly due to an increase in accounting and legal fees. We 
can show that direct flotation costs increase by highly significant 90 basispoints of 
gross proceeds. This increase is almost entirely due to an increase in accounting 
and legal fees. Moreover, this increase is to a large extent due to an increase in 
fixed flotation costs. Therefore, smaller firms are by far more heavily affected than 
larger firms. In fact, we can show that beyond an offering size of $250 millions 
there is no SOX-specific impact on direct flotation costs, while up to an offering size 
of $100 millions the additional cost is relatively stable and equal to 0.5 million year 
2000 dollars. It is not surprising, therefore, that accounting and legal fees for a 
$20 million offering almost double. 
We  checked  the  robustness  of  our  findings  by  applying  a  matched  sample  ap-
proach. Of course, the change in non-underwriting fees after the introduction of 
SOX could be due to a different composition of the IPO universe. Therefore, we 
formed a matched sample by applying a propensity score machting approach. In 
this way we were able to gather counterfactual evidence in the sense that we can 
estimate what the flotation cost of a company would have been, if the IPO had 
been done before the introduction of SOX. Notably, we do not find any evidence 
that our results are driven by a selection bias. 
Our findings have also implications for future research. By affecting the cost of go-
ing public it is very likely that SOX has had an impact on information production, 
even though this impact might be negligible for large firms. In fact, all our results 
corroborate the presumption that SOX has led to increased efforts of accounting 
and legal firms. Consequently, we should expect that more or higher quality infor-
mation is available and exploitable within the IPO process. In this sense, our find-
ings suggest that SOX might have altered the amount and quality of information 
being available within the IPO process, in particular for small offerings. As IPO pric-15 
ing is highly related to the degree of publicly available information, our findings 
therefore suggest that SOX should have had an impact on underpricing as well. 
 16 
6. Bibliography 
Altinkiliç, O. and Hansen, R. S. (2000): Are There Economies of Scale in Underwrit-
ing Fees? Evidence of Rising External Financing Costs, Review of Financial Studies, 
13, pp. 191–218. 
Bargeron, L., Lehn, K. and Zutter, C. (2007): Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-
Taking, University of Pitsburgh, Working Paper. 
Caliendo, M. and Kopeinig, S. (2008): Some practical guidance for the implementa-
tion of propensity score matching, Journal of Economic Surveys, 22, pp. 31–72. 
Carney, W. J. (2006): The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of 
“Going Private”, Emory Law Journal, 55, pp. 141–160. 
Carter, R. B. and Manaster, S. (1990): Initial public offerings and underwriter repu-
tation, Journal of Finance, 45, pp. 1045–1068. 
Chhaochharia, V. and Grinstein, Y. (2007): Corporate Governance and Firm Value: 
the Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules, Journal of Finance, 62, pp. 1789–1825. 
Chen, H.-C. and Ritter, J. R. (2000): The Seven Percent Solution, The Journal of 
Finance, 55, pp. 1105–1131. 
Coates, J. C. (2007): The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 21, pp. 91–116. 
Eldridge,  S.  W.  and  Kealey,  B.  T.  (2005):  SOX  Costs:  Auditor  Attestation under 
Section 404, University of Nebraska, Working Paper. 
Engel, E., Hayes, R. M. and Wang, X. (2007): The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ 
Going Private Decisions, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, pp. 116–145. 
Green, W. H. (2002): Econometric Analysis, 5
th Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Hansen, R. S. (2001): Do Investment Banks Compete in IPOs?: The Advent of the 
7 percent Plus Contract, Journal of Financial Economics, 59, pp. 313–346. 
Jain, P. K., Kim, J.-C. and Rezaee, Z. (2006): Trends and determinants of market 
liquidity in the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act periods, 14th Annual Conference 
on  Financial  Economics  and  Accounting  (FEA),  Available  at  SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=488142. 
Jain, P. K. (2006) and Rezaee, Z.: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Security 
Market Behavior: Early Evidence, Contemporary Accounting Research, 23, pp. 629-
654. 17 
Kamar, E., Pinar, K.-M. and Eric L. T. (2007): Sarbanes-Oxley's effects on small 
firms:  What  is  the  evidence?,  USC  CLEO  Research  Paper  No.  C07-9, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=993198. 
Kaserer, C. and Kraft, M. (2003): How Issue Size, Risk and Complexity are Influ-
encing  External  Financing  Costs:  German  IPOs  Analyzed  from  an  Economics  of 
Scale Perspective, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 30, Digital Version. 
Lee, I., Lochhead, S., Ritter, J. R., and Zhao, Q. (1996): The costs of raising capi-
tal, The Journal of Financial Research, 59, pp. 59–74. 
Leon, G. (2006): Stigmata: The Stain of Sarbanes-Oxley on U.S. Capital Markets, 
GWU  Law  School  Public  Law  Research  Paper  No.  224, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=921394. 
Li,  H.,  Pincus,  M.  P.K.  and  Rego,  S.  O.  (2008):  Market  Reaction  to Events  Sur-
rounding  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002  and  Earnings  Management,  Journal  of 
Law & Economics, 51, pp. 111–134. 
Litvak,  K.  (2007):  The  effect  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  on  non-US  companies 
cross-listed in the US, Journal of Corporate Finance, 13, pp. 195–228.  
Martin, J. (2008): Prop ups during lockups, Swiss Finance Institute, Working Paper. 
Morrison,  A.  D.  (2004):  Sarbanes  Oxley,  Corporate  Governance  and  Operational 
Risk, Sarbanes-Oxley Seminar Paper, Said Business School, University of Oxford 
and 2020 Governance AB, Stockholm. 
Ribstein,  L.  E.  (2005):  Sarbanes-Oxley  After  Three  Years,  Law  and  Economics 
Working Papers, University of Illinois College of Law, Working Paper. 
Ritter, J. R. (1987): The Costs of Going Public, Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 
pp. 269–281. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002): The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Torstila, S. (2003): The clustering of IPO Gross Spreads: International Evidence, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, pp. 673–694. 
White, H., (1980): A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and 
a direct test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica, 48, pp. 817–38. 
Wintoki, M. B. (2007): Corporate Boards and Regulation: The effect of the Sar-
banes–Oxley Act and the Exchange Listing Requirements on Firm Value, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 13, pp. 229–250. 
Zhang, I. X. (2007): Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, pp. 74–115. 18 
7. Tables and Figures 
Mean Std. Dev. Median
Number of observations 1116
Total Direct Costs 9.28% 2.18% 8.96%
Gross Spread / Und. Expenses 6.84% 0.58% 7.00%
Non-underwriting expenses 2.44% 1.95% 2.00%
accounting + legal fees 1.55% 1.27% 1.23%
Gross Proceeds (2000 $mil) 147.0 400.7 73.5
Assets before IPO (2000 $mil) 441.1 2067.7 64.4
Ratio of Primary Shares 90.6% 21.3% 100.0%
Age of Company (years) 15.0 22.1 7.0
% NASDAQ 82.1%
% Venture Capital Backed 55.6%
% Technology Firms 39.2%
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1998 – 2007. 
Notes:  Data  is  collected  from  Thomson’s  SDC  platinum  database.  All  cost  items  are  ex-
pressed in percent of gross proceeds. Both gross proceeds and assets are adjusted to pur-
chasing prices of 2000 and denoted in million dollars. The period before SOX includes IPOs 
between 1998 and 2002. The period after SOX includes IPOs between 2003 and 2007. Ratio 
of primary shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares issued. Age of the IPO 
firm is the difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. Percent 
venture capital backed equals the percent of IPOs that were backed by venture capitalists 
before the IPO. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a high-tech industry are classified as 
technology firms. 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Number of observations
Total Direct Costs 9.51% 9.16% 9.18% 8.88% 3.60% *** 3.16% ***
Gross Spread / Und. Expenses 6.76% 7.00% 6.88% 7.00% -1.87% *** 0.00%
Non-underwriting expenses 2.75% 2.24% 2.29% 1.89% 20.02% *** 18.77% ***
accounting + legal fees 1.90% 1.54% 1.39% 1.13% 36.94% *** 35.75% ***
Gross Proceeds (2000 $mil) 149.9 85.4 145.7 69.4 2.95% *** 23.08% ***
Assets before IPO (2000 $mil) 508.5 118.2 409.7 51.8 24.11% *** 128.20% ***
Ratio of Primary Shares 84.0% 100.0% 93.7% 100.0% -10.3% *** 0.0%
Age of Company (years) 21.2 9.0 12.1 6.0 76.0% *** 50.0% ***
% NASDAQ ***
% Venture Capital Backed ***
% Technology Firms ***
-19.4%








Panel A. Panel B.
 
Table 2: Comparison of the pre- and post-SOX periods 
Notes:  Data  is  collected  from  Thomson’s  SDC  platinum  database.  All  cost  items  are  ex-
pressed in percent of gross proceeds. Both gross proceeds and assets are adjusted to pur-
chasing prices of 2000 and denoted in million dollars. The period before SOX includes IPOs 
between 1998 and 2002. The period after SOX includes IPOs between 2003 and 2007. Ratio 
of primary shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares emitted. Age of the IPO 
firm is the difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. Percent 19 
venture capital backed equals the percent of IPOs that were backed by venture capitalists 
before the IPO. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a high-tech industry are classified as 
technology firms. A two sample Gauss test is used here to examine whether the mean re-
sults  are  statistically  significant  different  from  each  other.  The  difference  of  medians  is 
tested by using the Mann-Whitney test. 
 


























Table 3: Choosing a functional form of gross proceeds explaining the direct 
costs and its components 
Notes: Data is collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum database. PROCEEDS represent the 
gross proceeds which are adjusted to the purchasing prices of 2000 and denoted in million 
dollars. The results base on estimates of a simple linear regression with the direct costs or a 
cost component as the dependent variable. All costs are expressed in percent of gross pro-
ceeds. The regression model includes a constant and the independent variable PROCEEDS in 
a functional form as indicated on the table. The F-statistic is based on standard errors cor-
rected by White’s (1980) method in order to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
 20 
Intercept 0.065 *** 0.067 *** 0.001 0.001
19.8 50.5 0.3 0.2
IPO Proceeds -8.8E-06 ***
-4.2
1 / (IPO Proceeds) 1.274 *** 1.180 *** 0.647 ***
14.0 14.4 12.6
Assets before IPO -1.5E-06 *** 2.1E-07 -1.9E-07 -1.7E-07
-3.6 0.4 -1.5 -1.5
LN(AGE) -0.001 ** -2.3E-04 -0.001 * -0.001 **
-2.1 -1.3 -1.8 -2.2
Ratio of Primary Shares 0.009 *** 0.001 0.007 *** 0.005 ***
4.3 0.5 4.7 4.5
NASDAQ (dummy) 2.4E-04 0.003 *** -0.002 * 0.000
0.2 5.6 -1.9 -0.2
Technology firm (dummy) 0.000 4.4E-04 ** 0.000 0.000
0.0 2.0 -0.5 -0.3
Venture-backing (dummy) -0.002 0.001 ** -0.002 ** -0.001 *
-1.6 2.1 -2.2 -1.8
Underwriter rank (dummy) 0.001 -0.001 *** 0.001 0.001
0.9 -3.1 1.0 0.8
Transition-year (dummy) 0.007 *** 0.002 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 ***
4.2 3.5 3.2 3.4
SOX (dummy) 0.009 *** -3.4E-04 0.009 *** 0.008 ***
8.7 -1.0 9.1 11.5
F-statistic 53.5 24.3 46.6 40.2
r-squared 0.605 0.495 0.560 0.454














Table 4: Basic regression analysis of price adjustments and underpricing 
Notes: Data is collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum database. The sample consists of 
1,116 firms that went public between 1998 and 2007. IPO proceeds equal the amount of 
money raised in the IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 million dollars. Assets before the 
IPO equal the total assets of the firm before the IPO, in year 2000 million dollars. Age of the 
IPO firm is the difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. Ratio of 
primary  shares  denotes  the  ratio  of  primary  shares  to  all  shares  issued.  NASDAQ  is  a 
dummy variable indicating IPOs that went public on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Firms that 
SDC defines as belonging to a high-technology industry are classified as technology firms. 
Underwriter rank is a measure of the quality of the underwriter, with the minimum rank 
being zero and the maximum being nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated meas-
ures of the Carter and Manaster rankings. Transition-year is a dummy variable set to 1 in 
case of the IPO taking place in 2002. SOX is a dummy variable set to 1 in case of the IPO 
taking place after 2002. White heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are shown in italic. ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level. 
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Intercept 0.006 ** 0.005 ** 0.003 0.001
2.1 2.3 0.9 0.6
1 / (IPO Proceeds) 1.017 *** 0.505 *** 0.944 *** 0.482 ***
11.6 14.0 13.7 11.4
Assets before IPO 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 **
-2.2 -2.2 -2.3 -2.4
LN(AGE) -0.001 * -0.001 ** 3.5E-04 1.1E-04
-1.7 -2.1 0.6 0.3
Ratio of Primary Shares 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.003 ***
3.9 3.6 3.3 2.8
NASDAQ (dummy) -0.004 *** -0.002 -0.004 *** -0.001
-3.0 -1.6 -2.7 -0.9
Technology firm (dummy) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.4 0.8 0.9 1.8
Venture-backing (dummy) -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 -0.001
-3.2 -2.9 -1.4 -1.1
Underwriter rank (dummy) 0.002 0.001 0.003 ** 0.002 **
1.6 1.4 2.3 2.2
Transition-year (dummy) 0.004 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 0.002
2.3 2.1 1.3 1.6
SOX (dummy) -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002
-0.9 -1.0 -1.9 -1.4
SOX (dummy)  0.704 *** 0.614 *** 0.795 *** 0.643 ***
/  (IPO Proceeds) 4.1 5.4 4.8 5.7
F-statistic 49.0 51.1 56.4 53.1
r-squared 0.596 0.637 0.518 0.576
Number of observations 1116 1116 1116 1116
Acc. and Legal 
fees (matched)










Table 5: Basic and matched sample regression analysis of total direct costs 
Notes: Data is collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum database. The sample consists of 
1,116 firms that went public between 1998 and 2007. The matched sample consists of 722 
IPOs over the same time period. IPO proceeds equal the amount of money raised in the IPO 
(excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 million dollars. Assets before the IPO equal the total assets 
of the firm before the IPO, in year 2000 million dollars. Age of the IPO firm is the difference 
between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. Ratio of primary shares denotes 
the ratio of primary shares to all shares issued. NASDAQ is a dummy variable indicating 
IPOs that went public on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Firms that SDC defines as belonging 
to a high-technology industry are classified as technology firms. Underwriter rank is a meas-
ure of the quality of the underwriter, with the minimum rank being zero and the maximum 
being nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures of the Carter and Manaster 
rankings. Transition-year is a dummy variable set to 1 in case of the IPO taking place in 
2002. SOX is a dummy variable set to 1 in case of the IPO taking place after 2002. White 
heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are shown in italic. ***, **, * denote significance at 





1 / (IPO Proceeds) 1.175 *** 0.643 ***
14.3 12.6
Assets before IPO 0.000 0.000
-1.5 -1.5
LN(AGE) -0.001 * -0.001 **
-1.7 -2.0
Ratio of Primary Shares 0.007 *** 0.005 ***
4.4 4.2
NASDAQ (dummy) -0.002 * 0.000
-1.7 0.0
Technology firm (dummy) -0.001 0.000
-0.6 -0.5
Venture-backing (dummy) -0.002 ** -0.001 *
-2.1 -1.8
Underwriter rank (dummy) 0.001 0.001
0.9 0.6
Y2002 (dummy) 0.005 *** 0.004 ***
3.2 3.3
Y2003 (dummy) 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
3.2 4.4
Y2004 (dummy) 0.009 *** 0.008 ***
6.1 7.7
Y2005 (dummy) 0.010 *** 0.009 ***
4.3 5.8
Y2006 (dummy) 0.008 *** 0.007 ***
5.9 6.3




Number of observations 1116 1116






Table 6: Regression Analysis 
Notes: Data is collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum database. The sample consists of 
1,116 firms that went public between 1998 and 2007. IPO proceeds equal the amount of 
money raised in the IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 million dollars. Assets before the 
IPO equal the total assets of the firm before the IPO, in year 2000 million dollars. Age of the 
IPO firm is the difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. Ratio of 
primary  shares  denotes  the  ratio  of  primary  shares  to  all  shares  issued.  NASDAQ  is  a 
dummy variable indicating IPOs that went public on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Firms that 
SDC defines as belonging to a high-technology industry are classified as technology firms. 
Underwriter rank is a measure of the quality of the underwriter, with the minimum rank 
being zero and the maximum being nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated meas-
ures  of  the  Carter  and  Manaster  rankings.  The  year  variables  2002.  2003,  2004,  2005, 
2006, and 2007 are dummy variables set to 1 in the respective year. White heteroskedastic-
ity robust t-statistics are shown in italic. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
level. 
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Gross proceeds in million dollar 20 50 100 250
Total Direct Costs
before SOX 13.0% 9.5% 8.4% 7.7%
after SOX 16.1% 10.6% 8.8% 7.7%
change in % 24.3% 11.8% 5.3% 0.5%
change in million $ 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1
Non-Underwriting Expenses
before SOX 5.5% 2.6% 1.6% 1.0%
after SOX 8.6% 3.7% 2.1% 1.1%
change in % 55.2% 44.8% 32.7% 14.1%
change in million $ 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4
Accounting & Legal fees
before SOX 3.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.7%
after SOX 5.9% 2.6% 1.5% 0.8%
change in % 94.3% 69.2% 44.6% 13.9%
change in million $ 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3
 
Table 7: Cost estimates based on linear regression results 
Notes: The estimates are based on data from Thomson’s SDC platinum database. The esti-
mates are calculated on the basis of results obtained via a simple linear regression model 
where costs are explained by size, a dummy variable indicating the SOX period, and an in-
teraction term of both variables (SOX / IPO Proceeds). All costs are expressed in percent of 
gross proceeds. 